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Abstract—A method is proposed, based on scan statistics, to
detect, identify, and localize illicit radiological material using
mobile sensors in an urban environment. Our method handles
varying levels of background radiation that change according
to an (unknown) environment. Our method can accurately
determine if a source is present along a street segment as well as
identify which of six possible sources generated the radiation.
Our method can also localize the source, when detected, to
within a few seconds. We have presented our results across a
range of decision thresholds allowing stakeholders to evaluate the
performance at different false alarm rates. Due to the simplicity
of our approach, our models can be trained in a few minutes
with very little training data and holds the potential to score
a run in real-time. Our method was one of the top performing
submissions in the Detecting Radiological Threats in Urban Areas
competition.
Index Terms—scan statistic, likelihood ratio, radiological de-
tection, urban threat
I. INTRODUCTION
The machine learning challenge Detecting Radiological
Threats in Urban Areas is concerned with detecting, identify-
ing, and locating radiological material using a moving sensor
in an urban environment. See the website [1] for full details.
The scenario is a mobile sensor that moves in a straight line on
a simulated road measuring gamma-ray energy levels. If there
is a radiological source present along the run, it emits energy
according its energy spectra. The energy received at the sensor
is obfuscated by the presence of background radiation sources
and reflections from the urban environment. For a set of testing
runs, the objectives are to: detect if there is a radiological
source in the run, identify the source (six possible sources
each with shielded or non-shielded profiles), and locate the
time at which the sensor was closest to the source.
II. DATA AND CHALLENGE DETAILS
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has
teamed with Topcoder to host a radiological detection competi-
tion [1]. The competition organizers have used a Monte Carlo
particle transport model to generate data from thousands of
runs that mimic what would be acquired by a mobile 2×4×16
NaI(Tl) detector moving down a simplified street in a mid-
sized U.S. city.
The runs are configured to capture the variability in an urban
setting; the sensor can move down a fictitious street in different
lanes and travel directions, move at different speeds (between
1.0 and 13.4 meters per second), and encounter different street
geometries (e.g., building layouts, construction material, land-
use, cross streets, etc.). Runs with a radiological source will
vary by the type of source (including shielded and unshielded
versions), the strength of source, and the location of the source
along the street. The source types are provided in Table I.
TABLE I
DESCRIPTION OF RADIOLOGICAL SOURCES
SourceID Source Name Source Description
0 Null No Source
1 HEU Highly enriched uranium
2 WGPu Weapons grade plutonium
3 131I Iodine, a medical isotope
4 60Co Cobalt, an industrial isotope
5 99mTc Technetium, a medical isotope
6 99mTc+HEU A combination of 99mTc and HEU
A total of 9700 labeled runs were made available (the data
can be accessed at the contest website [1]). There are 4900 null
runs and 800 runs from each of the six sources. The labels
for each run indicated the radiological source and time the
sensor was closest to the source (if non-null). The labels do
not indicate if the sources were shielded. The run data only
include the time and energy level recorded by the sensor. The
sensor speed, sensor location, and other environmental factors
were not provided.
In addition to the run data, the energy spectra for each
source type (both shielded and unshielded) located 1 meter
away from the sensor in a vacuum was also provided. From
these, we estimated the density (standardized frequency) of
the energy generated by each source (see Figure 1).
III. METHODOLOGY
Our approach to detection, identification, and localization
is based on the concept of scan statistics; that is, we search
over all possible sources, locations, and emission profiles to
obtain a test statistic that represents the combination that
provides the strongest evidence for a radiological emitter.
If the scan statistic exceeds a threshold, we declare that
a radiological source is present. For any run in which a
radiological source is suspected, our scan statistic approach
will explicitly incorporate an estimate of the source type and
source location.
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Fig. 1. Estimated source densities. The solid orange line is for unshielded
and the dotted blue line is for shielded sources. See Section III-B for details
of the estimation process.
A. Overview
Let k represent the source type, where k = 0 implies
no source and k ∈ K = {1.0, 1.1, 2.0, 2.1, . . . , 6.0, 6.1}
corresponds to one of the 6 radiological sources with (x.1)
and without (x.0) shielding. Let τ be the time (in secs) when
the sensor is closest to the source. For each run, H0 is the
null hypothesis of no source (i.e., k = 0) and H(k, τ) (for
k ∈ K and τ ≥ 30) is the hypothesis that the source is k and
the sensor is closest to the source at time τ . The restriction
τ ≥ 30 arises because the simulated contest data does not
contain a source within the first 30 seconds of a run.
A run is represented by the data {(ti, xi)}ni=1 where ti is the
ith time and xi the ith energy received by the sensor since the
start of the run. For a given run, the likelihood ratio (assuming
independence between observations conditional on the model
parameters) is
Λ(k, τ) =
Pr(Data | H(k, τ))
Pr(Data | H0) (1)
=
n∏
i=1
f(xi | H(k, τ))
f(xi | H0) (2)
which is the product of density ratios at the observations
x1, . . . , xn. The null density, f(xi | H0), can be directly
estimated from the training data (see Section III-B for details).
We assume that the density is stationary over all runs with no
source. However the density f(xi | H(k, τ)), which is the
density of observing an energy xi, at time ti, given that a
source of type k is located at time τ , will depend on how close
the sensor is from the source as well as the (unspecified in the
contest data) factors that affect how much source radiation is
received at the sensor (e.g., due to street geometry, building
types, land use, etc.).
Given a source of type k located at time τ , we denote piik(τ)
as the probability that an observation received at time ti came
from the source (as opposed to the background radiation).
This probability will be a function of the distance, ti − τ , the
sensor is from the source and the source strength relative to
the background radiation. A formal way to model the density
f(xi | H(k, τ)) is a statistical mixture
f(xi | H(k, τ)) = fk(xi)piik(τ) + f0(xi)(1− piik(τ)) (3)
where fk(xi) is the density of energy from source k, f0(xi)
is the density from the background, and 1 − piik(τ) is the
probability that an observation at time ti would receive a
measurement from the background. Plugging this into the
density ratios of (2) gives
f(xi | H(k, τ))
f(xi | H0) =
fk(xi)piik(τ) + f0(xi)(1− piik(τ))
f0(xi)
(4)
=
fk(xi)
f0(xi)
piik(τ) + (1− piik(τ)) (5)
This mixture model for f(x | H(k, τ)) could be estimated,
for example, with the EM algorithm that incorporates prior
information on piik(τ) according to knowledge about how far
a source will emit radiation. However this information was not
provided in the contest.
Because of the lack of information available to estimate
piik(τ) we based our test statistics on a simpler representation
of the strength of evidence that an observation arises from
an extraneous source. Consider a single observation xi which
is the recorded energy at time ti. If this observation actually
came from source k, then the log ratio
rik = log
fk(xi)
f0(xi)
, (6)
is expected to be greater than zero. However if it came from the
background (i.e., H0), then rik expected to be less than zero.
To reduce variability and focus attention on the observations
that are more likely to be seen from the source, we use the
statistic
Rik = max{0, rik} (7)
as our measure of evidence that observation i was from source
k. Compared to the (log of) (5), (7) only incorporates evidence
in favor of an extraneous source, the lower threshold at 0
reduces the variability, and doesn’t require estimation of piik.
Building off this statistic, we estimate the log of the
likelihood ratios in (2) as
S(k, τ, h) = log
(
Λˆ(k, τ)
)
(8)
=
n∑
i=1
K(ti − τ ;h)Rik (9)
which is in the form of a kernel smoother where K(ti−τ ;h) is
a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth (standard deviation) h ∈ H .
We considered bandwidths of H = {0.5, 0.75, 1, 1.25, 1.5}
seconds. The idea is that if the source is located at time τ , then
it will produce the most observations at times close to τ and
gradually produce fewer observations as the distance between
the sensor and source increases. Thus the R’s are weighted
according to how far they are away from the hypothesized τ .
Assuming that the source would emit radiation symmetri-
cally along the run (i.e., ignoring the influence of buildings and
street geometries since that information was not available),
τˆk = arg max
τ
S(k, τ, h) (10)
is the estimated time when the sensor is closest to the source
and the score
S˜(k, h) = max
τ
S(k, τ, h) (11)
= S(k, τˆk, h) (12)
is our measure of the evidence that radiation is being emitted
from a source of type k (using bandwidth h).
The next steps are to determine if H0 should be rejected
and, if so, estimate which alternative hypothesis is correct.
One problem with using S˜(k, h) as the test statistic is that
its variance may differ over k and h. Thus, if the variance
is not accounted for the model may produce too many false
alarms and over-attribute to certain sources. To help rectify
this, we estimated the mean, µ0(k, h), and standard deviation,
σ0(k, h), of S˜(k, h) when the data are generated under H0.
The standardized score,
Z(k, h) =
S˜(k, h)− µ0(k, h)
σ0(k, h)
(13)
will have approximately the same mean and variance over all
k and h allowing it to provide a fairer comparison between
sources and over bandwidths.
Our scan statistic for a run is the maximum value of Z over
all options for sources and bandwidths,
T = max
k∈K,h∈H
Z(k, h). (14)
We reject the null of no source if T ≥ φ, for some threshold
φ, and estimate the source as
kˆ = arg max
k∈K
max
h
Z(k, h) (15)
and source location as
τˆ = τˆkˆ (16)
where τˆk is given in (10).
B. Parameter Estimation
1) Estimating the Source Density: The energy spectra for
five of the six sources (both with and without shielding) was
provided in the form of an intensity histogram (count rate
per energy level) with 2 keV bin widths and the first bin
starting at 11 keV. We converted the intensity histograms into
a probability mass function (pmf) at energy levels between 11
and 4001 by increments of 0.5 keV using frequency histograms
(i.e., linear interpolation) and rescaling so it sums to one.
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Fig. 2. Estimated log density ratios, Rk(x). The solid orange line is for
unshielded and the dotted blue line is for shielded sources.
We were not provided the energy spectra for source 6, but
told it was ”a combination of 99mTc and HEU” [1]. We
assumed it was a 50-50 mix and used
fˆ6(x) = 0.5fˆ1(x) + 0.5fˆ5(x) (17)
where fˆk(x) is the estimated density (pmf) from source k. The
estimated pmfs for all six densities are given in Fig. 1.
2) Estimating the Null Density: The null density is es-
timated from the training runs with no source. An initial
exploratory analysis suggested that the null density appeared
stationary across each run with no discernible differences
between runs. Thus, we estimated the null density from
taking all energy measurements in a random 100 runs and
applying kernel density estimation using a Gaussian kernel
with bandwidth of 1 keV. The density estimate was then
converted to a pmf by rescaling the density estimates at a range
of energy levels between 11 and 4001 (keV) by increments of
0.5 keV to match the values from the six sources.
3) Estimating Rik: The value Rik = max{0, rik} can
be calculated in advance to enable a quick look up at run
time. Because the null and source densities were estimated
at the same set of discrete values, the log density ratios,
Rk(x) = max(0, log(fk(x)/f0(x))) can be pre-calculated for
every possible energy level. See Figure 2 for the estimated
values of Rk(x).
4) Estimating S(k, τ, h): The value S(k, τ, h) is the
smoothed value of R over time. Because the source strength
and run configurations (e.g., sensor speed, building interfer-
ence, etc.) can affect the distance that particles are received
by the sensor, we estimate it using a range of bandwidths
h ∈ H = {0.5, 0.75, 1, 1.25, 1.5}.
5) Estimating Z(k, h): The value Z(τ, h) is obtained by
standardizing S˜(τ, h) by subtracting the mean and dividing by
the standard deviation estimated from null (no source) runs.
We used a sample of 900 null runs to estimate the mean,
µ0(k, h), and standard deviation, σ0(k, h) for each source k ∈
K and bandwidth h ∈ H .
IV. RESULTS
Our method was applied to 8800 labeled runs. These runs
comprised 4000 runs without an extraneous source (null runs)
and 800 runs from each of the six sources. It is not known if
the sources are shielded, however the time when the sensor is
closest to the source is available. We evaluate our method on
its ability to detect, identify, and localize.
A. Detection
A source is declared to be present whenever the scan
statistic, given in (14), exceeds a threshold, i.e., T ≥ φ. The
optimal threshold φ depends on the costs for false alarms
and missed detections. Because this information varies across
applications, we present results across a variety of thresholds.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of T under different sources
(including the null). As expected, the test statistic is small for
the null runs and usually large for the runs with an radiological
source. Some common binary classification metrics are given
in Figure 4; these metrics are used to construct ROC and
Precision-Recall curves. Because there are no null runs with
T ≥ 3.26, the false positive rate (FPR) goes to zero after
this value. The true positive rate decreases as the threshold
is increased. The precision starts at 0.545 (4800/8800), since
54.5% of the runs contain a source, and then quickly rises as
the percentage of runs declared to have a source that actually
have a source increases.
B. Identification
The ability of our method to correctly identify the source
is also analyzed. Figure 5 gives the source identification
accuracy as a function of the decision threshold. Notice that
the performance is perfect when the evidence is strongest (i.e.,
φ > 50) and never dips below 86.2%.
Table II gives the confusion matrix obtained when φ = 2.5
(selected arbitrarily). At this threshold, 3977 null runs are
correctly assigned to have no source (true negatives) but
388 runs with a source are incorrectly classified as coming
from the background (false negatives) and 23 of the null
runs are incorrectly classified as coming from an extraneous
source (false positives). The confusion matrix also reveals
the difficulty of correctly discriminating source k = 6; 60
runs get assigned incorrectly to source k = 1 while 249
are incorrectly assigned to source k = 5. This indicates
potential improvements in the source identification with more
knowledge of the composition of source 6 (see (17) for the
current method of estimating the density of this source).
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Fig. 3. Histograms of the test statistic, T , under different sources.
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Fig. 4. Performance of the method as a function of the decision threshold φ.
The solid orange line is the False Positive Rate (FPR), the dotted blue line is
the Precision, and the dashed black line is the True Positive Rate (TPR).
TABLE II
CONFUSION MATRIX FOR φ = 2.5.
Estimated Source
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
Tr
ue
So
ur
ce
0 3977 3 7 1 3 4 5 4000
1 78 721 0 1 0 0 0 800
2 91 1 704 1 1 0 2 800
3 82 0 0 718 0 0 0 800
4 55 0 0 0 745 0 0 800
5 65 0 0 0 0 734 1 800
6 17 60 0 0 0 249 474 800
Total 4365 785 711 721 749 987 482 8800
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Fig. 5. Identification accuracy as a function of the decision threshold φ. This
shows the proportion of sources correctly identified (i.e., kˆ = k) over all runs
with an extraneous source.
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Fig. 6. Localization performance as a function of the decision threshold φ.
This shows the distance, |τ − τˆkˆ|, between the true and estimated time when
the sensor is closest to the source.
C. Localization
Our method is also able to accurately estimate the time
when the sensor is close to the source. Figure 6 shows the
distance (in seconds) from estimated source location τˆkˆ to the
true location τ for all the runs with a source present. Using
again a threshold of φ = 2.5, we find that the median distance
is 0.71 seconds, the mean distance is 1.13 seconds, and 95%
of distances are less than 3.05 seconds. Ideally, we would
examine the spatial distance (rather then temporal) between the
actual source and our estimate. Unfortunately, this information
was not provided; the only related information provided is
that the sensor speed can vary between 1 and 13.4 meters per
second. Thus we can only generally say that our method can
usually localize the source to within 40 meters.
V. RELATED WORK
There have a been a few reported methods for radiation
detection with mobile sensors in the literature. To locate
the change in position of a radiological source that moves
throughout a room indoors, [2] developed a nonlinear state
estimation algorithm that uses a constrained, feasible path,
sequential quadratic program to solve a recursive least squares
optimization problem. Several methods to detect a source are
described in [3] as well as an analysis of the degradation
in detection ability due to mobile (and other time restricted)
sensing platforms and sensitivity to the decision thresholds.
A comparison of both frequentist and Bayesian approaches
to detecting multiple sources is given in [4]. The authors
find that a properly constructed Bayesian model performs
best at identifying two and three sources. A comparison of
quick deterministic methods with the flexibility of probabilistic
methods is provided in [5]. The authors find that a careful
combination of the two approaches can provide a noticeable
improvement in performance while significantly reducing the
necessary computation. The Poisson-Clutter Split (PCS) algo-
rithm combines a Poisson distribution model (for background
plus source) with a Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test (GLRT)
to detect a specific source [6].
When multiple sources are possible, Gaussian mixture mod-
els can be used to detect and localize [7]. A distributed
sensor network is developed in [8] to detection, identify, and
locate a radiological source in large areas. A network of small
inexpensive mobile sensors was used to detect and identify
sources in [9]. The mean-shift clustering algorithm was used
in [10] to detect the presence of multiple sources in large urban
areas with a collection of many inexpensive mobile (e.g., 1500
cab mounted) sensors.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a method, based on scan statistics, to
detect, identify, and localize illicit radiological material using
mobile sensors in an urban environment. Our method handles
varying levels of background radiation that changes according
to the (unknown) environment. We can accurately determine if
a source is present along a run as well as identify which of six
possible sources generated the radiation. Our method can also
localize the source, when detected, to within a few seconds.
We have presented our results across a range of decision
thresholds allowing stakeholders to evaluate the performance
at different false alarm rates.
Due to the simplicity of our approach, our models can be
trained in a few minutes with very little training data and
holds the potential to accurately detect, identify, and locate
illicit sources in real-time.
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